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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant Bank of Ephraim appeals from a decision 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court as to the priorities 
of certain judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court awarded judgment on a Decree of 
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim, 
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association and the Utah State Tax Commission, as per the 
complaints of each creditor. The rights of the defendant 
Steinraann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon 
Corporation. The defendants, First State Bank and United 
1. 
States of America, were previously dismissed as parties 
defendant to the action. 
In its Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the District 
Court, in addition to awarding judgments to the judgment 
creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments of each 
creditor, as set forth in the appellant's Statement of Facts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to sustain the entry of judgment and 
priorities as set forth in the court below* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, re-
spondent substantially accepts the Statement of Facts of 
appellant, with several clarifications and additions as fol-
lows : 
1. Appellee Babylon Corporation has interest only in 
the cafe property. Babylon Corporation obtained this interest 
by assignment from Steven Kaye Steinmann. 
2. The mortgage that Halbert Davis gave to Steinmann was 
given the same day that the Bank of Ephraim note was given — 
August 7, 1970. (See defendant's Exhibit #5). 
3. The Steinmann mortgage was recorded after the Bank of 
Ephraim mortgage, but on the same day - August 10, 1970. (See 
defendant's Exhibit #3). At the time of the recordation of 
the Steinmann mortgage, the Bank of Ephraim had advanced only 
$2400.00 on the Bank of Ephraim note. Any monies advanced by 
the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property over and above $2400.00 
2. 
were advanced after the recordation of the Steinmann mortgage, 
and were purely optional. (Appellant's Brief, p. 9). 
4# The Steinmann mortgage was recorded at the request 
of Tibbs & Tervort, who then were counsel for the appellant, 
Bank of Ephraim. (See defendant's Exhibit #3). The fact that 
the deed was prepared by the escrow department of the Bank of 
Ephraim, and was recorded at the request of counsel for the 
appellant is important in establishing that as of August 10, 
1970, the appellant had actual notice of the Steinmann mortgage. 
5. As stated by the appellant, "the mortgage to Steven 
Kaye Steinmann expressly sets forth the fact that it was 
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank 6f Ephraim." What the 
appellant failed to mention is that th£ Steinmann mortgage 
expressly sets forth that it be second in lien priority to the 
Bank of Ephraim mortgage iri the amount of $2400.00. (Defen-
dant's Exhibit #3) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
APPELLANT BANK OF EPHRAIM HAS NO BASIS 
IN LAW OR IN FACT FOR ITS APPEAL AGAINST 
THE APPELLEE, BABYLON CORPORATION. 
Throughout its arguments, appellant addresses itself to 
appellee Prudential Federal Savings, and only in the closing 
one-half page is Babylon Corporation even mentioned. Appellant 
would have the Court believe that the facts of the Babylon 
mortgage are in relevant parts similar to the facts of the 
Prudential mortgage. Such is not the case. The Babylon mort-
gage differs from the Prudential mortgage in two very important 
3. 
respects. First, the Bank of Ephraim had actual notice of 
the Babylon mortgage, and thus was put on notice of a lien 
superior to its future optional advances. Se>cond, all ad-
vances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property were 
made after the giving of the Steinmann mortgage. As will be 
pointed out below, these two fact differences render inappli-
cable all of the appellant's arguments as appellant would 
have the Court apply them to Babylon Corporation. Indeed, 
the cases cited by the appellant support conclusively the 
position of the appellee, Babylon Corporation. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE BANK OF EPHRAIM HAD ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF THE BABYLON MORTGAGE, AND ALL 
OF THE APPELLANT'S ADVANCES WERE MADE 
AFTER THE RECORDATION OF THE BABYLON 
MORTGAGE, THE BABYLON LIEN HAS PRIORITY 
OVER ANY MONIES OPTIONALLY ADVANCED BY 
THE BANK OF EPHRAIM. 
The appellant has admitted from the beginning that the 
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and not 
obligatory under the mortgage. (Appellantfs Brief, p. 9). 
Authority almost universally advises that such advances, when 
given after notice of subsequent interests, do not have 
priority over such subsequent interests. The universal rule 
is quoted quite succinctly in Leche v. Ponca City Production 
Credit Association, 478 P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1970): 
"The applicable rule of law is stated in 
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, §234: 'The greater 
array of authority, however, is found on 
the side of the doctrine that advances 
made after notice of subsequent interests 
4. 
do not have priority over such inter-
ests. This rule has been applied to 
subsequent liens and encumbrances as 
well as to subsequent grants of the 
property. The mere specification in 
the senior mortgage that the further 
advances are not to exceed a fixed sum 
does not vary the rule. The Irule is 
especially applicable where the ad-
vancements are optional with the 
mortgagee...1 
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §230, at 299, 
the rule is stated: 'In accordance 
with the general rule, after notice of 
the attaching of a junior lien, the 
senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be 
protected in making further advances 
under his mortgage given to secure such 
advances, at least where he v^ as under 
no binding engagement to mak^ such ad-
vances. ' " 
The above cited case is not a materials men case, yet it 
does come down strongly to support Babylon's position. 
Other courts almost universally a|ree. In Kimmel v. Batty, 
168 Colo. 431, 451 P.2d 751, 753 (1969), the Supreme Court of 
Colorado approves of the rule that "..fif it is optional with 
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances, he will be pro-
tected by the security of his mortgage)only as to the advances 
made before the attaching of the juniojr lien or encumbrance." 
(emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Washington, jln National Bank of Wash-
ington v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 29 
(1973), also strongly agrees: 
"Thus, we are adhering to wh^t we per-
ceive to be the weight of authority... 
Optional advances under a construction 
loan agreement attach when the advances 
5. 
are actually made. Any liens attach-
ing prior to an optional advance would 
thus be superior to it, and attaching 
afterwards, junior to it." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also come down on point: 
"A senior mortgage for future advances 
will maintain seniority for advances 
made after actual notice of a junior 
lien if, but only if, there was a con-
tractual obligation to make such ad-
vances existing prior to the notice of 
the junior lien." Biersdorff v. Brum-
field, 93 Ida. 569, 468 P.2d 301, 302 
(1970) . 
The appellant cites Savings & Loan Society v. Burnett, 
106 Cal. 514, 39 P. 922, 926 (1895) as being controlling. In 
that case, quoting from Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 387, 19 P. 
641 (1888), the California Court states: 
"But the lien of the mortgage cannot 
be enforced against subsequent encum-
brances, of which the mortgagee has 
actual notice for advances or endorse-
ments made or given after such notice." 
A review of other cases cited by the appellant indicate 
that Iowa, Indiana and Alabama, as well as virtually all other 
jurisdictions, support the position that optional advances of 
a prior lienholder, after that prior lienholder has been given 
notice of subsequent interests, do not have priority over said 
subsequent interests. (See Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa 498, 
210 NW 559 (1926); Corn Belt Trust & Savings Bank of Belle 
Plaine v. May, 197 Iowa 54, 196 NW 735 (1924); Schmidt v. 
Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 NE 335, 337 (1897); Farmers Union 
Warehouse Co. v. Barnett Bros., 273 Ala. 435, 137 So. 176 
(1931); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wa.2d 29, 116 P.2d 
253, 255 (1941)). 
6. 
In reaching this rule of law, the courts have followed 
good sound reasoning and policy. If the courts allowed a 
first mortgage holder to make optional advances with priority 
ad infinitum, even after receiving notice of a second mort-
gageholder's interest, it would spell the death of the second 
mortgage. In the instant case, it should be obvious to the 
Court that the Babylon-Steinmann mortgage would not have been 
accepted for security if Steinmann had known that the Bank of 
Ephraim would attempt to take priority on all future optional 
advances, totally contrary to the law. The appellant Bank of 
Ephraim indicates that any future lienholders have the re-
sponsibility of ascertaining the true amount of indebtedness 
outstanding at the time that the second mortgage is put into 
effect - even when the amount cannot be determined from the 
face of the mortgage (Appellant's Brief, p. 11). This is 
true, and Steinmann took all possible steps to protect her-
self, by indicating that her mortgage was second to that of 
the Bank of Ephraim JLri the amount of $2400.00. (The exact 
amount already advanced). Bank of Ephraim, being the escrow 
agent in the Steinmann transaction, had actual notice of the 
above restriction. Therefore, in law and in policy, Bank 
of Ephraim should not receive priority over Steinmann-Babylon 
for any monies advanced after notice and recordation of the 
Steinmann-Babylon mortgage. ) 
The Court will note that the above panoply of law indicates 
that the Babylon Corporation should receive priority for all 
amounts over the $2400.00 already advanced at the time of the 
7. 
Steinmann-Babylon mortgage, rather than amounts over $3000.00, 
as decided in the court below. Although Babylon Corporation 
did raise this point in the court below, it has not preferred 
this point as a grounds for appeal and, therefore, does not 
ask for reversal of the lower court's judgment* 
POINT III 
THE INCLUSION IN THE BANK OF EPHRAIM 
MORTGAGE OF THE TYPEWRITTEN PHRASE 
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED 
$3000.00" LIMITS THE BANK'S PRIORITY 
AND RECOVERY ON THE MORTGAGE TO 
$3000.00. 
Although the multiplicity of authority under Point II 
should suffice to obtain the results for which the appellee, 
Babylon Corporation, asks, there is also solid authority which 
indicates that the $3000.00 limitation typed onto the Bank of 
Ephraim mortgage also may be conclusive. 
Appellant contends that the printed word in paragraph 2 
of the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, wherein it states "and for 
all of which this mortgage shall stand as a continuing security 
until paid" should supercede the large typed statement that 
"this mortgage covers all additional advances on this loan, 
the total principal amount not to exceed $3000.00." The 
typed statement is obviously a limitation on the mortgage 
security, and is irreconcilable with any statements which would 
allow unlimited security. 
The Bank of Ephraim mortgage was prepared by the appel-
lant, and thus should be construed most strongly against it: 
"... In case of uncertainty as to the 
meaning of a contract, it should be 
construed most strictly against its 
framer..." (Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 
U.2d 323, 400 "P.2d 503 (1965)). 
8. 
Additionally, 
"Where there is a printed form of a 
contract, and other words are inserted, 
in writing or otherwise, it is to be 
assumed that they take precedence over 
the printed matter." (Holland v. Brown, 
15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 78 (1964)). 
In the same light, Steven Kaye Steinmann was justified, 
when reviewing the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, to believe that 
the written (typed) word would take precedence over any am-
biguous printed statements. A mortgage cannot be both "for 
any other indebtedness at any time existing from the mortgagor 
to the mortgagee," and limited in principal amount "not to 
exceed $3000.00," unless the total debt outstanding is always 
$3000.00 or less. Because of the typed clause in the instant 
case, once the principal amount reaches $3000.00, any addi-
tional advances would not be secured under the mortgage. 
A fine Utah case in point is General Mills, Inc. v. 
Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943), in which a unan-
imous decision was rendered, and has stood the test of time of . 
over 33 years. In the General Mills case, there was a chattel 
mortgage securing the mortgagors f obligation to pay for turkey 
feed, drawn by the mortgagee. That mortgage contained two 
clauses which are amazingly similar to the clauses in question 
in the instant case. First, in the body of the printed mort-
gage, it is stated that the mortgage was security for "all 
Dther sums now or hereafter due or owing from the mortgagors 
to the mortgagee." Closely following was the limit "provided, 
however, that the maximum amount, the payment of which is to 
9. 
be secured hereby, is $3750.00. f5 The court decided that both 
clauses could not be operative; that there was an irreconcil-
able ambiguj-^y, and therefore rules of construction and intent 
were to be followed. Quoting from the text of the opinion at 
page 1093: 
"It is so eleirentary that an ambiguity 
in a written instrument is construed more 
strongly against the party who drew the 
instrument that citation of authorities 
should be unnecessary. This is especially 
so where the one drafting the instrument 
has the advantage of a. lender of money." 
(emphasis added). 
After a thorough consideration of lav/ and policy, the 
court finally stated, at 1094, that: 
"We are constrained to hold from a con-
sideration of the language of the con-
tract in its entirety, the contract res 
and the relation of the parties to each 
other, that the parties intended by their 
agreement to enter into a chattel mort-
gage to secure the sum of not to exceed 
$3750.00 by a lien. . 
The similarities in the two cases are striking. Both cases 
involved mortgages. In both cases the mortgagee prepared the 
mortgage papers. Both cases have an !unlimited1 security clause, 
as well as a 'limiting' clause. The law in Utah is clear. Wher<= 
there is a limiting clause in a mortgage, "the mortgage involved 
is in fact for an liquidated amount with a maximum..." (General 
Mills, supra, at 1093) . 
As applied to the case at bar, the General Mills case 
clearly indicates that any priorities that, the appellant Bank 
of Ephraim could have on tne secured cafe property step at 
$3000.00, as indicated on the fact of the mortgage. To grant 
more would be going against at least 33 years of clear-cut Utah 
10. 
law, as well as policy which dictates that ambiguities in 
written instruments (and in particular, recorded instruments 
designed to give notice) should be construed most strongly 
against the preparer of the instrument. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant argues almost exclusively against Pruden-
tial Federal Savings, and never comes on point against the 
appellee Babylon Corporation. As extensively cited in Point 
II, the universal rule is that advances given after notice 
of subsequent interests do not have priority over such sub-
sequent interest. Finally, the $3000.00 express limit as 
typed onto the face of the mortgage limits any priorities of 
the Bank of Ephraim under the mortgage of $3000.00. Both ex-
tensive law and common sense policy dictate that the judgment 
of the lower court should be affirmed in its entirety as it 
applies to the appellee Babylon Corporation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. IR&x LfeVi-s^^for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Babylon Corporati 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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